pursuant to clause 12-a of rule 1, the chair declares the house in recess until approximate 6:3h

and we're ju building 100,000 miles of new construction. :tw it was in 2017. and the basic mission is to help encourage a about evidence-based solutions to the hardest, toughest policy es we face. as you heard, they are

responsible for bringing us here today. this program center of one of the great debates in american politics today which is how to craft economic strategy in a more dangerous world. what level of trade and economic integration is important to our national service and which is important to commanding our innovation today. u.s., and what level of resilience is necessary industries and technologies, , tax incentives, mix of protection, restrictions. we were the leader -- the u.s. we were the leader -- the u.s. the u.s.a. was theth leader inr 'a mixture of private capital and government support. a messy mix, a messy process

that would change what we think we know -- challenge what we think we know about governments and markets and what works and what doesn't. we gave up part of it in manufacturing, and we are now in the processf trying to figure out how to regain the ability to build a meaningful share of the world's mr. vance chips in the u.s. this -- world's most advanced chips in the u.s. this is complicated and hard and consequent. we have three great people together through the topic. mike schmidt, who is responsible for deciding how to allocate the dollars and the terms and conditions of the grants. chris miller is the author of "chip war," the definitive, excellent history of how we got here. and greg ip is correspondent for "the wall street journal and he will moderate. [applause]

greg: it really is a privilege to be appeared to be speaking to chris and mike, 2 excellent people have gotten to know studying this topic. my last hands-on experience with chips was their use ago when i was editor of our collegeto opee the memory card out. since then i've basically blank on everything related. but i correct that problem by picking up chris's book. i paid him the ultimate compliment, irc went and bought the book --i actually went and bought the book. it is very informative and readable. i want the question about how we careso much. we make a lot of things can we outsource a lot of things. international trade is about specializations. how are chips different from oil, cars? how are semiconductors special

and why do we have to have a domestic supply of these things when we don't feel that way ng else? >> chips are like oil in some ways and that everything relies onwe need energy for every aspet of ournor every aspect of the manufacturing base, for microwaves to dishwashers to a new car, which has an average of 1000 chips inside. it is basically everything manufactured which one often requires. but they are different from oil in aimportant way, which is that oil is basically all the same, whereas chips are all different. there are different types of chips produced by different factories. one, other countries produce others. chips, they found that they we sourcing chips from dozens of companies in a number of different countries, and they found that the world is increasingly reliant on a smaller and the most important example is taiwan

which produces 90% of chips, in yo phones, pcs, data centers. and 100% of the gpu chips that make artificial intelligence possible. there is no other industry that is simultaneously critically and concentrated in one country. greg: why is it important that we have our supply in the? chris: my view is if there are multiple suppliers that are resilient, we don't have to worry about earthquakes or wars, i would be much more comfortable the united states. but that is not the reality. there is one company and one country producing all of them, and that is a situation that becomes even more concen have my than we did a couple years ago. it is a we government policy that is going to change. greg: speaking of government policy, you and i have talked about it a number of times over the years. wh is it important that the

united states has its own supply chips and not relying on family --friendly countries? giress report on how the program is doing. michael: i like chris'si think e resilient global supply chain. and then the question is what is the u.s.' that outcome. the way think about it is the u.s. has a really important role why? we are a big part of a global economy, abo a quarter of the global economy. so that is just an important st then we have tremendous national assets to bear on solvtremendous, abundant natural■ resources, and very importantly, we are the the wo'f chips, particularly on the

leading edge. so all of that works together to say the united states has a really important role to play, and being a source of more diversified global supply chain. and i think you are seeing that in how the chips program is unfolding. i think the results thus far are pretty extraordinary. we have fi -- we have the first set of investments happening at an extraordinary scale, more those are investment that have not only been announced, but actual money going into the ground. since the chips act passed, there's more investment in electronic manufacturing happening in this country thvios combined. you see a hockey-stick impact in terms of actual investment as a result of the chips act. intel's investment program, over

$100 billion, the largest fight a company in the history of this country. $55 billion in arizona, the largest foreign direct investment in history. roughly $45 billion in the second largest. the scale of what we're doing here is truly extraordinary. i think the diversity of the firms that we are attracting to nest in the united states is truly extraordinary. chris talked about concentration. concentration is n only geographic, it is in firms. there are only five firms in the entire world capable of producing leading-edge chips at e, on the logic side and memory side. we have agreements in place with four of them to expand dramatically here. one■a just announced a packaging project in indiana. think the diversity of firms is remarkable. the last thing is the

technologies are really important. each of these firms is bringing the most advanced technologies to our shores. and we have advanced packaging, which is usually important. we can get into that. we r&d investments happening. intel's investments in oregon have long been a kind of r&d--pf american r&d. he chips act we have samsunguilding r&d in texas. there are only tee in the world that do leading processing technology already, tain, korea, oregon. we now have a■1 fourth, samsungs doing it in texas. results are extraordinary. greg: do, where are we in terms of actual money going out the door, chips being made? when will the first american- made chips start michael: so first of all, there

are chips made in america now. what we don't have is any chips on the leading edge being made right now. we've said -- set a goal of 20% of leading-edge production by the end of the decade. projecting 28%, so somewhere in thatwe -- if you go to these facilities, what you see is extraordinary.10,000 constructis driving in and out every day, 50 biggest cranes in the world at these facilities. just remarkable progress. and i think we will see chips being14 chips- funded facilities at the end of this year. greg: wow, and of this year --

end of this year? when might that be? michael:to get into it. greg: we are in a very aggressive industrial policy and i want to ask questions on that. the u.s. was once the leader in a lot of things, a lot of electronic, not just chipmaking. a lot of that migrated to east for a while we lost our leadership in semiconductors to japan, which launched a huge push, like china is of companies with a lot of capacity. states very similar to what we see today. and yet 10 years later, japan has more or less lost leadership again, as the industry moved from memory to logic. intel was top. it kind of looks like a panic was overdone. united states today has done

well having pursued a model that more or less turned its back on the industrial policy that is so popular among countries that are not doing well. i guess i want to ask the question, why can't we just rket to fix this problem? why are we so fixated on the idea that we have to get in there and steal this incentive allowing the market-- this incentive allowing the marketer because it has in the past? chris: i think that assumes a world without any wars. the reality is the environment is grim. anybody reading the headlines out of singapore this weekend where the chinese ministry of defense and the u.s. cr■py of defense were speaking, it is hard to be reassured a china and taiwan. the difference between the u.s. trade disputes with japan in the 1980's and early 1990's and u.s.-china today is the economic considerations are secondary to the political considerations, what happens if there is a conflict. the reali iwein taiwan ana gginn

china, all of which get knocked off-line the moment a potential escalation begins. that is what is behind all of this. to use the phrase "duster policy" ike -- "industrial policy" turns it into an economic problem, and first in the minds of those in congress who pushed the chips act through, what happens when we lose access to these critical supplies of chip making? michael: right now the u.s. produces zero percent of the global supply of leading-edge chips. there is no way that changes, absent a public policy intervention. so you can decide we are ok with that. we have the world's foundational technology critical to militaries -- we haven't talked about ai yet. you are looking at decades whe national security, public

policy, geopolitics will be shaped by ai. united states is a leader in s our workforce, our firms, our ecosystems. we produce enough chips to fuel that boom. again, you can decide that is ok, or you can decide there's security value as a countryú in building greater resilience. greg: i gss -- has there ever been a free market in chips, or is it always been heavily government-influenced? chris: certainly in history has government-influenced, and if you look at subsidies going the chip industry, you can look at our friends in asia, but you can lookt the largest subsidizer, china. my economist friends talk about a level playing field. that's great. i asked them to put -- that's a great theory. i can ask them to put that in

practice. tarting point,mentioning, you ce world and live with the security ramifications of that. greg: ok, you made the case for why semiconductors are special and this is a place where we should industrial policy. one of the reasons we don't do much industrial policy in this ve a good track record. we've had like the jones act t now. we make less than 1% of the world's ships as a result, and americans pay extraordinarily supersonic transports, god knows how many industrial policy adventures we had an energy, all of which ended up being gigantic white elephants. what did you learn looking from that history, how do we make sure that the industrial policy with chips does not repeat the mieswhat do you figure we did wg in the past that we make sure we

don't do now? michael: well, i was the first employee of the chips team back in september 2022. you don't think about this, but major government program starts, there is no astructure, there is no model. tim might do this with in gover. but your starting with a blank sle. way, from the craft of government standpoint, that was one of the most exciting things about it. the legislation provides flexibility. a lot of discretion of the executive branch. it is a question of whether you can make it work. secretary raimondo felt -- i would say we had to focus on three things early on. number one was people. have to get a good team in place. secretary raimondo in particular is a magner talent, and we built this extraordinary group of people in the chips office. , investors, industry, government

backgrounds, national security back rents, workforce backgrounds, etc. impossible to do without tt.they important is setting a vision. when you -- it is very easy -- you see this a lot in developing programs that make a whole bunch of investments and try to step back and discern a strategy. i call it like you put the stars in the sky and draw the constellation. we to take a different approach, which was not the full constellation, but you should have a sense of what it is going to look like. and we felt accountable for explaining that to the public. we put out what we call our vision for success that talks about in reasonably concrete ways what our jees are going to be. that required a lot of work, a

lot of deep thinking early on, while we were hiring the team and building the department, etc., but we felt it was that important to put that stake it's been a really important device for engaging our our applicants respond to it, they understand what we are trying achieve, they help us effectuate that vision, but also important internally. internally as we are sitting in investment committee meetings and we are consulate com vision. -- we are consulate coming back to that vision. d in what we need to do energy for the country. the last thingnd division in pl, you have to build the pipes of the program, the nitty-gritty, programmatic details that effectuategain pillars, we have been able to build an operation that at this point at least is on the right track. greg: you mentioned success.

what does success look like, and where it is being proximal rank in the criteria of things you look at a measure of success? michael: it's usually important. i think -- it is usually important.-- it is hugely important. i think it is important at our funding opportunity outlines a of criteria. national security. but right among that are emotional viability and financial strength. we are providing a subsidy -- most of the capital is still coming from the companies. it's really important that it's on a beyond sustainable economic footing. e chips act itself, a requirement that we look at that. that is how we will get to a point where hopefully we acreatg

investment t. chris: i would add two things. rs off, the decision was made early on to provide a small shareholder capital was critical. chips,verage 10ish percent of the is borne by the company. they have a strong incentive to get it right. the second is a decision made in the writing of the chips act to fund u.s. firms would also foreign firms investing in the united states, which is not normally when you think of with industrial policy but is cral to having real competition among companies. we have three when it comes to -- producing the best chips sufficiently, that preserves as much of the market as we can get in the program. greg: so from my read of where the industry is on r firms, the, the amazons, they

are enthusiastic about this, but they are kind of ambivalent about their willingness to actually buy the output of these plants. i feel like this is where the road. you can build a plant, but for that plant to be self-sustaining in the long-term, it needs customers. theóé company needs to make a good marn.ase thati the customers are there and are willing to pay the cost differential for an american-made chiphat ensures that these companies will be self sustaining a profitable t not be demonstration plants putting out tiny eyedrop full of chips to prove their american bona fides? chris: from a company perspective, once they put forward the capital expense sure, they have a very strong incentive -- but they've also been very careful not to put that money up front, so their own in a very

measured white -- their own capex in a very measured way, their building (s) the into their own plants so they can pull the plug if isn't going to be there in a few years time. chris: you can talk about the way you are writing the but it seems to me that that is a positive sign. mpanieare thinking about this with market dynamics very clearly in mind. they look at the smartphone market, the pc market, and went to move tools into the factory. to me it seems very predictable if you ask a big customer of companies, would you commit to buying x or y facility, they will say we will not commit to it because there are negotiations. i'm not of allspice we have not had many big announcements from customers saying we will -- i am not at all surprised we have not had many big announcements from customers saying we will buy in advance.

there is a lot of examine about a more diverse supplier base. the companies don'want to mark richards when there is one 90% suppli+

more awareness than there in cd with supply-chaini truly believ, the cost of fragile supply chains can be priced in. requir- telling this story that it requires investors playing that role. i think that's something i hope to see more and more over time. you see it most acutely in chips right now because chipsot -- the narrative out of the pandemic was so immediate and concrete. but i think it's something that needs focus across the economy. greg: to expand on the profitability question, to what exte yours in the industry's interests aligned?f

meaning when you put out your requests for proposals, there there that were not explicitly ected to making the ultimate project possible. ■requirements for on-site daycae for construction workers, union scale wages for unionized workers. cannot use funds to buy back stocks, licensing agreements withof things that were very constraining on the freedom -- the degreess and manufacturers have. and i know thatmanufacturers --m talking to all that there was a lot of grumbling about that and some republicans voted for the chips act when they saw what they thoht were progressive priorities layered into this. is that not get in the way of ultima success? chris: in terms -- michael: in terms of alignment, in some sense we both

wanted to be successful. in others, they wanted more money. so, the leading edge companies, that was more than $70 billion. more than we had. t think, you know, we've been able to work really well together to execute against some shared objectives. ■f■jas onewere at one of the leading edge sites. we were there for the big announcement and looking over this massive -- like a single one of these sites, they are all bigger than such part massive plots of land. 11 football fields.

30 football fields in this country? tens of billions of dollars. by the way, that's where we are putting the childcare facility, you know? and by the way, a lot of these areas are kind of remote. had a kid, if i were trying to figure out childcare, that would probably be helpful in attracting a work worse. i think that in that sense, it's been working out pretty well. greg: chris? michael: the result -- chris: in any program there is a lot of political interest involved in a big part of that is separating it from the -- domestic policy. taiwan, they did really good job of that. metrics advocacy, to the extent that we can keep these programs insulated from politics, the congress and a challenge for the

administration as well. greg: you wrote in your book -- there were two angles i remembered. ■kthe major motivators for the foundation of thinry. other words, nonunionized. do you think those foundational principles have been diluted by this administration's insistence on profit sharing scale? we have seen the reports on how construction in arizona was held up because of conflict with the building trade. i've -- chris: i think the union issue is nuanced. on the one hand, the critique of being overly burdensome has its affinity. on the other hand, if you talk to the contractors involved and constrict -- which specific instruction trades they are interested in getting, they will talk about

unique skill sets■?■o unionization is not problematic and could even be helpful. my view has been more nuanced than a yes or no. i think it is it depends, probably nothing answer you're looking for, but the truth. historically, one of the reasons that ship industry was driving towards less and less regulated markets was because historically labor costs really mattered. that much. that's they reality. these are super automated facility and labor is a small share of your long-run costs. even at the construction level, labor is a moderate part of the costa burton. véwe over index labor costs as o why the u.s. is moresive than other locations. it's a part of the story. the treatment of capital investment and other factors, they are just as in■ and our

sources of core comparativ■[nta. chris:re -- michael: prevailing wage is a part of the statut and a part of a lot of the federal statutes involved in construction work. @fjust one thing i would says, i keep talking about the scale, when each of these sites has 10,000 workers showingday, to af qualified construction workers, i think pulling the indus, labor, all of these resources together to help achieve this critical national objective is kind of whgreg: of course a lots being done with china in mind. china's not sitting still. i want to dig in as we make

these strides on advanced cpsonn the lagging edge chips is growing. i think it was 17% in 2015, now around 21% is the number i have. it was 17%, now 31%, contract 39% in a few. these are the chips that we ran out of during. cars sitting unfinished. it made, looks to me we are becomin crucial park here. another piece important, chinese companies are not required to bring back the costs of capital and the other day we read that the elliott investment hedge fund is pressuring texas instrument on cap x. that's not happening to these chinese competitors.

like come out ah that, that does not money? mi think -- chris: i think that's why we should assume the free ■ymarket and act on the basis of reality. china just announced they closed their third investment fund, $45 million inthere have been localt funds and provincial government funds and supposedly private equity funds around all of state owned firms. the aggregate what's been put the state owned street in the last decade has been multiple times higher, vastly higher. the thesis that we should just attend this is a market we to the facts and that's why i wouldn't be surprised if the biden ainistration increased a freight on input from chi w ago

. most chips are imported from the u.s., sent to vietnam, thailand, assembled into goods sent to the u.s. i think we will end should see more effort on that front to deal with the trade like you said, the company is facing calls toeduce. but there's also economic security. china has imposed major -- major trading partners in the last we want the manufacturing base to be reliant on chips that are sourced from china? doesn't seem like a smart policy to me. greg: how do you fix that? michael: i think that the problem is real, let me say that. our team is very much in the market, day toand here, you howe

are seeing from china is actually impacting prices. it's going to be real and i think it is an issue that buyers serious not a complicated issue, because as we said, these are often, chips aremponents of oths that end up being imported. so, what the exact tools chips are a part of that. we should say making investment not only on the leading edge, talking about that today, but we have a sick if it can investment in global foundries that will build the first new greenfield -- not really greenfield it's a new fab on their site in new york. a currently mature facility you know, it's a part of the agreement, the technology that's particularly critical.

national security, like that 22 fdx technology, for example. we have a role to play that and i think we have to look at a broader they put out a survey, e what the supply chains look like. there's a lot of data that needs to bec& integrated. it's important that we have a software conversation about this issue. i think there's kind of more to come there. greg: thinking through the chinese calculus here, why is that the chinas raci■ forrd to self-sufficiency in chips? biggest ever year is semi nductors imported from strategic adversaries, taiwan, korea, japan, the united states. it's clear that there is an effort to become self-sufficient

se■ of war, china will have the chips that the manufacturing base requires. i think we should think hard about why china is trying to do that. not only in terms of dollars and cents, companies getting return on capit investment, he war. ■ne 'd to do the same. greg: do we need a second chips act? do we need a second chips act to meet additional challenge? chris: the oec that at least one chipmaker was receiving more subsidies from foreign governments. no surprise where they were choosing to invest. this is an unacceptable status

quo. as far as other governments continue to subsidize, we kept hours impacted. we can debate the right mechanism. greg: mike? michael: me, personally, one chips act is enough. [laughter] yeah, look, the other what i would make on this, it's a stunning level of demand for resources, right? we are going to end up, you know, providing far less subsidies then requested in many insts. like i'm disappointed, are worthwhile.

would be strengthening the plot base of the country. in that that additional funding could definitely be put to use productively and i agree with chris, the tax credits are important as well. :eg we are nothing only ones doing this. announced similar things since the chips act came out. japan, they are up to 20 billion. france, 5 billion. billion. is it time to worry about a race to the bottom here where everybody is subsidizing this thing and we end up with too much capacity, too muchunprofite entire experiment is a disaster? chris: i worry about overcapacity at the leading edge. greg: add, it strikes me

that all of this is happening in an uncoordinated fashion. edge, lacking edge, altering the same thing. i worry about that. chris:ew so, technology improvey couple of years. structural, such that we have never seen before. china, t control. who was winning, it was beijing. that's one way to look at the +qccoordination -- problem. ■japan, european countries, discussed in a way that we could speak to them. looking at who is investing,

there hasn't been a lot of u.s. investment in the leading edge, with semiconductor's the s de out, is there a lot of lap? you would be satisfied with the labor. michael: i totally agree and those are conversations that we have had actively with 1000 partners. in the chips office we had a team dedicated to internationale relationships. build them directly. i think that the coordination is something we will build up. something that is really important. it's a good start.

at u.s. euro trade technology council, it has been a consistent theme at the principal level. i think you are seeing a lot of constructive progress on that. at what is happening across the globe, you know, where the investments are happening, it kind of makes sense where t industrial base of each geography is right now. we will continue to work on that overtime. greg: i do want to have i want e more before we go to our guests here, it's about workforce. getting into policy, it's not just making sure the demand is there for the supplies, but in terms of the workforce, you need skilled, dedicated people with the right training, the right attitude, the right culture, all that stuff.

there have been a lot of examples, like tsmc, supposedly for long hours that the taiwan he and -- taiwanians do. that for them there, south korea, taiwan, they have the criminal background. every -- creme de la creme. but that's not the case here. i had a conversation with a young gentleman doing a phd in science at purdue, born and raised in taiwan. why study here? worklife balance is important to me, i don't want to work in they just assume you will work there for the rest of your life. even the taiwanese are coming here because they have like differena real challenge. the question to you is, are we ready to meet the workforceg de.

michael: i think it's an interesting dichotomy that i perceive. one is yes, of course, it's a■5 new industry essentially from scratch on the leading edge. you've got to roll up your sleeves and get it done. work with institutions, community colleges coming, workforce organizations to build the pipeline. the good news about them as they take a while to build them, so ile you are doing that you can build that workout and we as a government have a role to play. all of our mutual investments include 40 million, 50 million dollars in investments.l work wl stakeholders to make it happen, right? that is oft-term challent i think we can address.

that's one part of the dichotomy. the other piece is, when you zoom out and talk to the strength of the american workforce, the strength of our institutions of higher education, frankly the strength of our economy that just kind of homes along --u hums along in a remarkable way, when you look around the world, all of that is a major asset nationally as .ompanies make investment vision if you are buying a plot of land that is larger than central park to bui fabs, you are not only thinkingúv about the next three years or five years. you are thinking about the next 20 or 30 years. chris: i would say that an interesting perspective on this question for the u.s. you can get by visiting tokyo or taipei,

elsewhere, because every ceo in the world says theiggest problem is workforce. south korea, no one wants to do the chip industry, everyone wants to be a doctor. japan, average age is 55. everyone has a workforce complaint or challenge. do step back, i look at where you have the best combination chip manufacturing in town. the u.s. is by far the world's leader. end-users, the u.s. is by far the most attractive ways, which is part of why you see some of these fis opening facilities in places like their. greg: so, we have a couple of folks with microphones here. steve, over there.

>> thank you so much. i'm, lay out industrial targets for the nation. i veorchestration get a hold of government cross finance sectors and industrial planning. my worry about what we are trying to, having gone from the obama administration review couldn't say it to being all in, it's not just about chips and a small sliver. you have to create an ecosystem that completely surrounds that. failing to see are the other dimensions of the u.s. if you talk toam cannot get

the people into the country easi need to manage and operate, train within the facilities they are building. i'm interested i's happening with the whole of government approach, the only way to you make a real industrial policy scheme and vetted, work, and continue across administrations. michael: well, let me start with i will start with where chris left off. starting with the ecosystem, it's pretty good, right? have incredible natural resources and abundant energy. a fair amount of water. we have workforce.

we have a predominant global positi i the acquisition of chips on the leading edge. all of that conspires to give us retail ones we are building off of. the question is, what can we do as a government to make sure that we are fueling that■0 oath wh is an important role. but we have done is build what we call our thruster support ns. we've decided, we have a few clusters that will be important to us. let's roll up ourleeves and figure out what we need to do. that could brk local stakeholdes like appropriating or could be

pulling in other federal reserve. >> [inaudible] that ended up at a dutch firm [inaudible] a lot of the other national lab partnerships [inaudible] environment [inaudible] so, i don't know what the next [inaudible] but it seems to me that how do you see that in a healthy way in the u.s. ecosystem? greg: i guess that part -- michael: i guess that part chip, which we haven't talked about today. 11 billion is focused on

building the natural -- natural semiconductor center. the fundamental premise there is pre-paradigm shiftingnd of technologies with the united states, which the u.s. continues to be at the forefront of in. it all fits together as a part of a broader strategy greg: question back there? >> yes, my name iroger, editorial contributor on technology policy for "the hill," recently did an op-ed on this subject. two questions i raised the sort of touched on but didn't really get to, at the highest level of extraction and then the lowest,

for decades the united states lectured countries like rotectionism being ethically and practically bad, hurting your consumers and it doesn't work. what do we tell countries today, like india, turkey, brazil, argentina? should they also -- obviously germany, britain, japan can do it they want. should they not strive to protect their economieshigh-endr things? jet afeel are essential. abstractly, what is our orientation on the concept of protectionism after the chips act. at the lowest level of practicality how do we avoid a situation where the companies favored by the u.s. government

do admirals, congressmen and whatnot, to ensure that they keeping avery by the u.s. government. this a death spiral you can get into here, there you have a lot of reason to protect that, keep that. chris: there's the economic t tariffs and a wartime scenario in which our entire manufacturing base shuts down, leaving this abstract theorizing to my colonist friends. we are in a situation where after 30 months of work in russia in the ukraine, the entire western war is being up to buy the russians. we've got an extraordinarily severe problem in our industrial base, the entire industrial base

being something going wrong between china and■u tai in my list of priorities in the morning, i were a slightly less about the implications of tariff rate changes and this and that economic. and more on what happs if something goes wrong in the taiwan straits and by the way, it looks like the earlier everyday in newspaper and that's the overriding focus in the -- of what we are talking about hearing and we can leave these theoretical debates to future professors to analyze. greg: and how do where firms art winning through lobbying, i guess, would be the way to put it. michael: a couple of things. one, you need to design an extremely rigorous process, which we have done at the chips office. the rigor of commercial

scrutiny, strategic scrutiny, fi, that is what a lot of us sit across the table from with these companies, saying that we know you can be successful with less; than. it's harder to do, but the chief investment officer at 25 years, they are an investor. the whole team that we've built is capable of the conversation. it's a said, we are at the end of the day -- the■o

the fact standards have struggled to keep up with the rate of that they have corporate sectors and investment projects that have low return if any return. none of that is more complica a competition that's not primarily betweenom also inn country, you can't have your head in the sand act that fact. i think to our credit, we're going to be much more transparent than china is we're going to have processes that people have designed, it's going

to be out in the public view, scrutiny from congress, from the media. all of that is very good. i want all that. but it is certainly the case that if your primary trading part and primary competitor is mixing economicsnd pol you can't pretend you can keep them accept ravment >> you'll have 26% leading edge capacity at the end of the process 10 years from now. but there are people who think taiwan could become us within a year or two depending on how you ad signals from china. at what point are we truly self and no longer vulnerable? is that an achievable goal? >> we're never going to be self-sufficient. we're never going to be self-sufficient in the united states or just the western hemisphere or just our g-7 friends. it's a spectrum. how much less reliant, how dangerously reliant are we confn

places like the taiwan straits.e movement on that. if you look at the new facility in japan, talk about allies. we had u.s. firms publicly say they're going to shift their chip production from taiwan to japan.emselves more resilience in case of these >> i think self-sufficiency is -- has never been the objective. the semiconductor supply is the most intricate,op almost miracus invention to is that is not somu can just oh, it's all here we're shut off from this. that's not how it works.■) the question of resilience, it's

not an on-off switch you build it over time. and i think that -- i'll come back to the statistic i shared at the outset which is the since the capital investment in electronics manufacturerring in this country than you saw for the previous 26 years combined. the ef seeing that is resilience being built. and our job is to make sure that continues. >> thank you, chris. thank incredibly insightful discussion. really appreciate you c time wi. thank you to the audience.use] [capon 2024] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. p.org]

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